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ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION*
DOUGLAS W. ARNER*

The global credit crisis of 2008 demonstrated beyond any doubt that
preexisting international arrangements were insufficient to preserve
stability in the global financial system, resulting in the most serious
global economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression. This
Article examines the agenda being pursued through the Group of 20
(G-20), the FinancialStability Board (FSB), and related organizations
to reform internationalfinancial regulation in the wake of the global
financial crisis, focusing on whether the international regulatory
agenda in fact addresses the fundamental sources of systemic risk
underlying the global crisis. In addressing this question, the Article
begins by suggesting the basic elements of a financialregulatory system
to effectively address systemic risk, arguing that in each case, the global
financial crisis highlighted specific failures of the pre-crisis regulatory
approach, then provides an overview and analysis of international
responses to the globalfinancial crisis, focusing on the G-20 and FSB.
The Article concludes by arguing that, while much has been achieved
to date, the post-crisis internationalregulatory reforms that have been
adopted would not have prevented the global financial crisis, nor are
they sufficient to lay the foundations for future global financial
stability.
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INTRODUCTION

The global credit crisis of 2008 demonstrated beyond any doubt
that preexisting international arrangements were insufficient to
preserve stability in the global financial system, resulting in the most
serious global economic and financial crisis since the Great
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Depression.' Similar to most other official reports and post-crisis
analyses, in reviewing the causes of the crisis in the United States, the
official Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) concluded, first,
that the crisis was avoidable,2 and, second, that the crisis was caused
by (1) "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision";
(2) "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management
at many systemically important financial institutions";' (3) "a
combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of
transparency";' and (4) "a systemic breakdown in accountability and
ethics."' In the context of addressing the crisis, the FCIC found the
U.S. government and regulatory system "w[ere] ill prepared for the
crisis, and [their] inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and
panic in the financial markets."'
While these conclusions focus on the U.S. financial system, they
are equally applicable to the experiences of the United Kingdom and

1. There is now a massive and ever-growing literature on the causes of the global
financial crisis. For the official analysis in the United States, see generally U.S. FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf. For the leading discussion in the United Kingdom
and global context, see generally FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner-review.pdf. For the leading discussion in the
European Union, see generally THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE EU,
REPORT (2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/finances/docs/de
larosiere-report en.pdf. Book-length treatments include: JOHN CASSIDY, How
MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES (2009); ROBERT W. KOLB, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME (2011); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS-AND THEMSELVES (2009); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
(2010); GILLIAN TETr, FOOL's GOLD: How THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT
J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A
CATASTROPHE (2009). For this author's analysis of the causes of the crisis, see generally
ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE (forthcoming 2011); Douglas W.
Arner, The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences, 43 INT'L LAW. 91

(2009).
2. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xvii.
3. Id. at xviii. The terms "regulation" and "supervision" are frequently used
interchangeably in financial writing. However, in a technical sense, "regulation" refers to
the actual rules, systems, and structures, while "supervision" refers to the process of
monitoring both compliance with "regulation" and also the overall condition of markets
and financial market participants.
4. Id.

5. Id. at xix.
6. Id. at xxii.
7. Id. at xxi.
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the European Union.' The financial crisis of 2008 was truly a global
crisis, and one which emanated from the global financial system and
from international regulatory efforts to address common risks and
concerns, including financial stability.9 Financial stability, at its most
elemental level, depends on regulators effectively monitoring,
preventing, and addressing systemic risk,"o and the global financial
crisis of 2008 showed that pre-crisis international financial regulatory
approaches were insufficient to prevent systemic risk or to maintain
the stability of the global financial system. Moreover, the crisis
demonstrated that preventing and addressing systemic risk is the
fundamental priority of financial regulatory design, not only at the
domestic level, but also in the context of the global financial system
and the pseudo-system of international regulatory cooperation which
has evolved to address its regulation.
This Article examines the agenda currently being pursued
through the Group of 20 (G-20), the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
and related organizations to reform international financial regulation
in the wake of the global financial crisis, and it focuses on whether the
international regulatory agenda in fact addresses the main sources of
systemic risk underlying the global crisis." In other words, in the
theme of this symposium issue, is the post-crisis process of adaptation
of international financial regulation sufficient to support the future
resilience of the global financial system? In addressing this question,
Part I of this Article begins by suggesting the basic elements of a
8. For detailed discussion and similar conclusions, see generally THE

HIGH-LEVEL

GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE EU, supra note 1.

9. For a detailed discussion of the pre-crisis international arrangements addressing
financial stability and their evolution, see DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY,
ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE ROLE OF LAW 63-88 (2007); Rolf H. Weber & Douglas

W. Amer, Toward a New Design for InternationalFinancialRegulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 391,406-20 (2007).
10. Systemic risk is defined as:
the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and
attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial
system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on
the real economy. Systemic risk events can be sudden and unexpected, or the
likelihood of their occurrence can build up through time in the absence of
appropriate policy responses. The adverse real economic effects from systemic
problems are generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to
credit flows, and from the destruction of asset values.
Grp. of Ten [G-10], Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, at 126 (2001),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf.
11. This Article does not consider purely domestic (e.g., U.S.) or regional (e.g., E.U.)
responses.
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financial regulatory system needed to effectively address systemic risk
and argues that, in each case, the global financial crisis highlighted
specific failures of the pre-crisis regulatory approach.
In order to assess the central question, Part II provides an
overview of international responses to the global financial crisis,
focusing on the G-20 and FSB. Despite its seeming ambition, it
remains open to debate whether the G-20/FSB response to date, if
implemented prior to the global financial crisis, would have in fact
been sufficient to prevent its occurrence-arguably the central policy
objective at this point in time." With this overall objective in mind,
Part III turns to the issues where arguably the greatest success has
been achieved-regulation and infrastructure. Parts IV and V then
discuss areas where arguably less has been achieved, notably
macroprudential regulation, regulatory system design, addressing
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and financial
institution resolution. The Article then concludes by arguing that,
while much has been achieved to date, the post-crisis international
regulatory reforms that have been adopted to date would not have
prevented the global financial crisis, nor are they sufficient to lay the
foundation for future global financial stability.
I. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SYSTEMiC RISK
Designing a regulatory system to mitigate systemic risk requires
taking account of seven core elements inherent in all financial
systems. 3 First, the system must ensure the existence of a robust

financial infrastructure, especially payment and settlement systems.
Financial infrastructure is the essential "plumbing" of any financial
system and must maintain stability and effectiveness. Second, the
regulatory system should support the existence of well-managed
financial institutions with effective corporate governance and risk
management systems. While such regulation cannot and should not
prevent the failure of financial institutions, it still must provide
ground rules and incentives to improve management when possible.
Third, financial markets require information; regulation should thus
provide disclosure requirements for financial institutions, markets,
and products sufficient to support market discipline and address
12. International efforts need to be forward-looking, as well, and should seek to put in
place arrangements to address the next crisis, rather than simply addressing the failures
relating to the last crisis. However, this Article argues that international efforts have not
yet even dealt with the issues raised by the last crisis, let alone addressed issues relating to
future crises.
13. This framework is derived from ARNER, supra note 9, at 317-19, 322-35.
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information asymmetries which may have negative implications for
market functioning and confidence. At the same time, disclosure
requirements should be sufficient to provide regulators with
comprehensive information not only about individual financial
institutions and products ("microprudential regulation"), but also
about interlinkages across markets, institutions, and products
("macroprudential regulation"). Fourth, in addition to reinforcing
risk management and market discipline, the regulatory system should
provide minimum requirements for safety and soundness of
individual
financial
institutions,
markets,
and
essential
infrastructures-what is traditionally known as "prudential
regulation." These four elements seek both to prevent systemic
financial crises and to establish the primary regulatory elements
supporting the effective functioning of any financial system.
At the same time, a system needs to be able to address crises
when they occur. The final three elements thus seek to establish a
minimum regulatory framework for such circumstances. First, there
should be a liquidity provider (or lender) of last resort to provide
liquidity to financial institutions and markets on an appropriate basis.
The central bank of a given monetary system typically fills this role.
Second, in order to address the possibility of financial institution
failure, there should be mechanisms for resolving problematic
financial institutions, including insolvency arrangements. Finally,
there must be mechanisms to protect financial services consumers in
order to maintain market confidence, even in the event of financial
institution failure.
While this framework applies to the design of any domestic or
regional financial system in countering systemic risk, in the context of
a globalized financial system, these issues cannot be addressed solely
in individual jurisdictions: they require global coordination and
cooperation. Global coordination is necessary not only to assure high
regulatory standards, but also to ensure a level playing field across
jurisdictions. In the global financial crisis, regulatory weaknesses in
each of these areas combined by allowing excesses to develop and by
making their resolution extremely difficult.
First, in relation to infrastructure, the central weakness exposed
by the crisis has been in relation to the current bilateral structure of
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. In this structure, OTC
derivatives transactions are organized on a bilateral contractual basis,
generally supported by collateral, without central trading or clearing,
resulting in exposure to risks of counterparty failure, in addition to
any risks associated with the transaction itself. In addition, the
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bilateral OTC structure minimized transparency both to participants
and to regulators, which increased the risks of loss of confidence and
contagion across products, institutions, and markets. These issues
were exposed most directly in the context of Lehman Brothers and
AIG.
Second, in relation to corporate governance, it has become
evident that many financial institutions failed to adequately manage
their own risks or businesses prior to the global financial crisis.14 This
is certainly one of the central failures in the global financial crisis.
Third, disclosure requirements did not sufficiently support
transparency and market discipline. In fact, systemic risks arose due
to asymmetric information-essentially weaknesses in transparency
and disclosure." Such issues are characteristic of the highly complex
structured products that acted as the transmission mechanism of the
excesses preceding the crisis and led to adverse selection issues during
the crisis. The reliance on credit ratings and credit rating agencies
exacerbated such issues both prior to and during the crisis.16 In this
respect, transparency is fundamental not only to stability, but also to
effective market functioning and should be a continuing, major focus.
Fourth, in relation to prudential regulation, in most cases,
systemic risk did not arise from areas which were the subject of
regulatory responsibility. Instead, risks arose primarily from areas
which were largely unregulated; these practices are now described as
"shadow banking."" Examples include mortgage broker activities;
off-balance-sheet activities of banks, thrifts, and securities firms; OTC
derivatives; and nontraditional activities of insurance companies. In
these cases, risks often arose from regulatory arbitrage as financial
firms actively moved activities outside of regulated areas.' 8 Such
regulatory arbitrage was also in many cases made possible by the
14. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xix.
15. See id. at xix-xx.
16. See, e.g., Paul Lejot et al., Securitization in East Asia 32 (Asian Dev. Bank,
Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 12, 2008), available at
http://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP12_Securitization-inEastAsia.pdf ("Periods of
market disruption tend to include calls for [credit] rating agency reform based upon the
observation that they often fail to predict imminent credit problems.").
17. See generally Z. POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORTS
No. 458, SHADOW BANKING (July 2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staffjreports/sr458.pdf (discussing shadow banks, their role in the U.S. economy,
and their relationship with traditional, central-bank-backed banks); Financial Stability
Board [FSB], Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues-A Background Note of the Financial
Stability Board (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_110412a.pdf.
18. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xx.

1586

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

splintering of financial regulation in the United States across a large
number of regulators, with individual regulators usually less
concerned about activities falling outside the scope of their major
responsibilities.1 9 In addition, systemic risks arose due to improperly
designed prudential regulatory standards, especially in relation to
capital, liquidity, and leverage. In this respect, appropriate coverage
of regulation is an essential focus, especially with regard to improving
the quality, quantity, and international consistency of capital,
including regulation to prevent excessive leverage and requiring
buffers of resources to be built up in good times.
Fifth, in relation to liquidity, resolution, and consumer
protection, systemic risk developed due to the lack of appropriate
mechanisms to deal with problems which arose from unregulated
and/or unexpected sources. Examples include the necessity of
rescuing AIG and also the lack of a mechanism for appropriately
resolving Lehman Brothers.20 Prior to 2008, liquidity assistance was
generally limited to banks. The crisis exposed the limitations of the
separation of liquidity provision from prudential regulation, most
obviously in the cases of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, and AIG. In addition to the clear need for effective resolution
mechanisms for banks, the lack of a similar mechanism to deal with
non-banks or financial conglomerates (whether bank, thrift, or other
financial holding company structures) highlighted a key weakness in
most regulatory systems.
In hindsight, it is now clear that too much attention was placed
on monetary policy rather than balancing monetary policy and
financial stability; that regulatory attention focused excessively on the
safety and soundness of individual financial institutions rather than
on systemic risks and linkages across institutions and markets; that
prudential regulatory and risk management systems did not take
adequate account of market cycles and crises; and that the realities of
potential failures of large, complex financial institutions had not been
adequately addressed in advance. Against this framework, this Article
next turns to the post-crisis international regulatory agenda of the G20 and FSB.

19. Id. at xxi.
20. See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
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II. THE POST-CRISIS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY
AGENDA

At the international level, the G-20 has assumed the leading role
in coordinating post-crisis responses and financial regulatory reforms,
and thus its responses over the last three years logically provide the
starting point for analysis of global financial reforms. 2 1 While the G20 is not a traditional treaty-based international organization, and its
pronouncements have no international legal force, it has become the
main policy-directing body for international financial and economic
policy.22 The impact of the G-20 on international financial regulation
results mainly from domestic implementation of internationally
agreed approaches as well as through voting control of the more
formal international organizations, such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.' Unlike areas such as
trade and currency issues, the G-20 has arguably been quite effective
in both formulating and implementing its international financial
regulatory agenda. This Part thus first discusses the contours of the
G-20 financial regulatory agenda before turning to the consequential
issue of mechanisms for ensuring its implementation.

21. The G-20 was created in 1999 after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. About G-20, G20, http://www.g20.orglabout what-is-g20.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2011). From 1999 to
2008, it was comprised of ministers of finance and central bank governors meeting
annually, supported by biannual meetings of deputy ministers and deputy central bank
governors. Id. In November of 2008, it met at Washington, D.C., for the first time at the
heads-of-government level. Id. Since that time, it has met four times at the heads-ofgovernment level: in London (April 2009), in Pittsburgh (September 2009), in Toronto
(July 2010), and in Seoul (November 2010). Id. The next G-20 leaders' summit is
scheduled for Paris, France in July of 2011. Since 2008, the G-20 has also met twice per
year (in advance of each leaders' summit) at the level of deputy ministers of finance and
deputy central bank governors. Id. Official communiqu6s are typically released for each
leaders' summit and each meeting of ministers of finance and central bank governors. Id.
Meetings at the level of deputy ministers of finance and deputy central bank governors do
not typically result in officially released communiquds. Id.
22. This Article considers only the G-20 agenda for financial regulatory reform and
does not discuss G-20 initiatives relating to reform of the international financial
architecture. For a comprehensive discussion of the Washington and London summits, see
Arner, supra note 1, at 120-34. For discussion of the G-20 agenda for reform of the
international financial architecture, see Douglas W. Amer & Ross P. Buckley,
Redesigning the Architectureof the Global FinancialSystem, MELB. J. INT'L L., Nov. 2010,
at 1, 22-36, available at http://mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/issues/current-issue.
23. Control of the IMF and World Bank is exerted through a system of voting based
on shareholding, with the G-20 holding together over eighty percent of the votes of both
institutions. See JOHN HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR: A
CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE WTO 113-15
(2008); Amer & Buckley, supranote 22, at 27-30.
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The First G-20 Leaders' Summit: Establishingthe Agenda for
Post-crisisFinancialRegulatory Reform
At its initial leaders' summit in Washington, D.C., in November
2008, the G-20 began to address financial regulatory reform by
focusing on the causes of the global financial crisis and identifying its
overall agenda. In addressing the causes and necessary responses to
the global financial crisis, the G-20 set the parameters for its approach
to post-crisis financial regulation:

A.

[W]e will implement reforms that will strengthen financial
markets and regulatory regimes so as to avoid future crises.
Regulation is first and foremost the responsibility of national
regulators who constitute the first line of defense against
market instability. However, our financial markets are global in
scope, therefore, intensified international cooperation among
regulators and strengthening of international standards, where
necessary, and their consistent implementation is necessary to
protect against adverse cross-border, regional and global
developments affecting international financial stability.
Regulators must ensure that their actions support market
discipline, avoid potentially adverse impacts on other countries,
including regulatory arbitrage, and support competition,
dynamism and innovation in the marketplace.2 4
Leaders established five main principles to guide the reform
agenda: (1) strengthening transparency and accountability, (2)
enhancing sound regulation, (3) promoting integrity in financial
markets, (4) reinforcing international cooperation, and (5) reforming
the financial architecture.' For each of these five principles, the G-20
agreed to a detailed action plan, incorporating both immediate and
medium-term actions and outlining the core agenda for post-crisis
reform of international financial regulatory standards. The action
plans for "enhancing sound regulation" and "reinforcing international
cooperation" are summarized in Table 1 below.

24. Grp. of Twenty [G-20], Declaration:Summit on FinancialMarkets and the World
Economy, at 2 (Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g2Osummit
declaration.pdf.
25. Id. at 3. Issues relating to reform of the international financial architecture are
beyond the scope of this Article. For detailed discussion, see generally BUCKLEY &
ARNER, supra note 1; Arner & Buckley, supra note 22.
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Table 1: Summary of G-20 FinancialRegulatory Reform Agenda21

1. Regulatory
Mitigate procyclicality, including in the
context of valuation and leverage, bank
capital, executive compensation, and
provisioning practices

Regimes
Review the structure and principles of
individual regulatory systems to
ensure compatibility with global
finance; G-20 members undertake a
Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP) report and support the
transparent assessments of countries'
national regulatory systems
Review the differentiated nature of
regulation in the banking, securities,
and insurance sectors; review scope of
financial regulation, with a special
emphasis on institutions, instruments,
and markets that are currently
unregulated, along with ensuring that
all systemically important institutions
are appropriately regulated
Review resolution regimes and
bankruptcy laws to ensure that they
permit an orderly wind-down of large,
complex cross-border financial
institutions
Harmonize definitions of capital in
order to achieve consistent measures of
capital and capital adequacy

II. Prudential Oversight
Regulators take steps to ensure that credit Register credit ratings agencies that
rating agencies meet high standards and
provide public ratings
avoid conflicts of interest, provide greater
disclosure to investors and to issuers, and
differentiate ratings for complex products
Review credit rating agencies' adoption of
the standards and mechanisms for
monitoring compliance

Develop robust and internationally
consistent approaches for liquidity
supervision of, and central bank
liquidity operations for, cross-border
banks

26. See generallv G-20. Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform (Nov. 15,
2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit declaration.pdf (laying out
issues to address and prescribing tactics to fix them).
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Ensure that financial institutions maintain
adequate capital; set strengthened capital
requirements for banks' structured credit
and securitization activities
Reduce the systemic risks of credit default
swaps (CDS) and over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives transactions
II. Risk Management
Develop enhanced guidance to strengthen
Ensure that regulatory policymakers
banks' risk management practices
are aware and able to respond rapidly
to evolution and innovation in financial
markets and products
Develop and implement procedures to
ensure that financial firms implement
policies to better manage liquidity risk,
including by creating strong liquidity
cushions
Ensure that financial firms develop
processes that provide for timely and
comprehensive measurement of risk
concentrations and large counterparty
risk positions across products and
geographies
Reassess risk management models to
guard against stress and report to
supervisors on their efforts
Develop firms' new stress testing models,
as appropriate
Promote clear internal incentives for
financial institutions
Exercise effective risk management and
due diligence over structured products
and securitization

Monitor substantial changes in asset
prices and their implications for the
macroeconomy and the financial
system
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IV. Reinforcing International Cooperation
Establish supervisory colleges for all
Collect information on areas where
major cross-border financial institutions
convergence in regulatory practices
such as accounting standards, auditing,
and deposit insurance is making
progress, is in need of accelerated
progress, or where there may be
potential for progress
Strengthen cross-border crisismanagement arrangements

Ensure that temporary measures to
restore stability and confidence have
minimal distortions and are unwound
in a timely, well-sequenced, and
coordinated manner

Within this agenda, G-20 leaders tasked their respective finance
ministers to focus on developing concrete recommendations in six
specific areas:
(1) Mitigating procyclicality in regulatory policy;
(2) Reviewing and aligning global accounting standards,
particularly for complex securities in times of stress;
(3) Strengthening the resilience and transparency of credit
derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks,
including by improving the infrastructure of over-thecounter markets;
(4) Reviewing compensation practices as they relate to
incentives for risk taking and innovation;
(5) Reviewing the mandates, governance, and resource
requirements of the [international financial institutions,
especially the IMF]; and
(6) Defining the scope of systemically important institutions
and determining their appropriate regulation or oversight.27
This initial G-20 agenda clearly seeks to address all seven
regulatory elements above, as necessary to address systemic risk.
However, as always, the real test of effectiveness lies in the
approaches taken to address the individual elements. Subsequent
leaders' summits have successively agreed to progressively more
detailed implementation arrangements.

27. G-20, supra note 24, at 4.
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The Second G-20 Leaders' Summit: Establishmentof the FSB
Building on the commitments and resolutions of this initial
meeting, the G-20 leaders met in London in April 2009 for their
second summit. The second summit focused mainly on fleshing out
policy directions within the context of the agenda set at the first
leaders' summit in November 2008 in Washington. Leaders agreed to
policy directions in major areas of the reform agenda and established
a new organization, the FSB, to be responsible for technical details
and to monitor implementation. In the resulting communiqub, G-20
leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the Washington agenda and
action plan for financial regulatory reform,' and they announced a
range of substantive agreements in major areas of the action plan,2 9
with additional details in a supplementary declaration."o The result
was agreement on the guiding parameters for specific action items of
the Washington financial regulatory reform agenda.
Of greatest significance, in relation to international cooperation
and financial standards, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF),
established along with the G-20 in 1999 in the wake of the Asian
financial crisis, was renamed and reconstituted as the FSB. 1 The G-20
leaders provided the FSB with a mandate to coordinate international
financial regulatory initiatives and monitor their implementation.32
B.

28. Commencing a pattern that has been repeated at subsequent summits, the G-20
released a detailed progress report on implementation of previous commitments. G-20,
Progress Report on the Actions of the Washington Action Plan, at 1-21 (Apr. 2, 2009),
availableat http://www.g20.org/Documents/FINALAnnexonActionPlan.pdf.
29. G-20, The Global Planfor Recovery and Reform, 1 13-16 (Apr. 2, 2009), available
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf.
30. G-20, Declarationon Strengthening the Financial System, at 1-6 (Apr. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/FinDepsFinReg-Annex_020409 -_1615
final.pdf. The declaration in fact addresses eight areas: (1) "Financial Stability Board,"
(2) "International cooperation," (3) "Prudential regulation," (4) "The scope of
regulation," (5) "Compensation," (6) "Tax havens and non-cooperative jurisdictions," (7)
"Accounting standards," and (8) "Credit Rating Agencies." Id. The Declaration also
addresses issues relating to the IMF's and FSB's development of early warning systems.
Id. at 1.
31. For a detailed discussion of the FSB, see generally Douglas W. Arner & Michael
W. Taylor, The Global Credit Crisis and the FinancialStability Board: Hardeningthe Soft
Law of InternationalFinancialRegulation?, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 488 (2009).
32. The FSB Charter provides:
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the
international level the work of national financial authorities and international
standard setting bodies (SSBs) in order to develop and promote the
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector
policies. In collaboration with the international financial institutions, the FSB will
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Hosted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)13 in Basel,
Switzerland, the FSB brings together G-20 finance ministries, central
banks, and regulatory authorities, along with the main international
and regional financial institutions: the BIS, IMF, World Bank,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
European Central Bank, and European Commission. In addition, the
main international standard-setting bodies are included: the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Committee on the Global
Financial System, and Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems (CPSS)."
As reconstituted following the 2009 London G-20 summit, the
FSB has a ten-point mandate detailing its role in supporting
international financial regulatory cooperation." In turn, FSB member

address vulnerabilities affecting financial systems in the interest of global financial
stability.
FSB Charter art. 1, available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0909
25d.pdf. The FSB Charter explicitly provides that it is not a legal document. Id. art. 16
("This Charter is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations.").
33. Formed initially to support reparations payments in the wake of World War I, BIS
History---Overview, BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS, http://bis.org/aboutlhistory.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2011), today, the BIS serves as the main international organization and
forum for central banks, About BIS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://bis.orglabout/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2011). The BIS also hosts a range of financial regulatory
organizations, such as the FSB. Douglas W. Amer et al., Central Banks and Central Bank
Cooperation in the Global FinancialSystem, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV.
L.J. 1, 40 (2010) (discussing the BIS in detail).
34. See Links to FSB Members, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstability
board.org/members/links.htm (last visited Apr. 29,2011) (listing FSB members).
35. The FSB Charter specifically provides:
(1) As part of its mandate, the FSB will:
(a) assess vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and identify and
review on a timely and ongoing basis the regulatory, supervisory and related
actions needed to address them, and their outcomes;
(b) promote coordination and information exchange among authorities
responsible for financial stability;
(c) monitor and advise on market developments and their implications for
regulatory policy;
(d) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards;
(e) undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of the
international standard setting bodies to ensure their work is timely,
coordinated, focused on priorities and addressing gaps;
(f) set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges;
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jurisdictions, subject to FSB reporting and evaluation, commit to
"pursue the maintenance of financial stability"; "maintain the
openness and transparency of the financial sector"; "implement
international financial standards"; and "undergo periodic peer
reviews, using among other evidence IMF/World Bank public
Financial Sector Assessment Program reports."3 6
The FSB can therefore be seen as the central organization
responsible for coordinating detailed development of the G-20
international regulatory reform agenda and also for monitoring its
implementation.
C.

The Third and Fourth Leaders' Summits: Maintaining
Commitment
The third and fourth leaders' summits in September 2009 and
June 2010 were most significant in affirming commitment to the
agenda and major policy directions established in previous summits.
In September 2009, at their third summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
G-20 leaders reiterated their support for existing initiatives and
committed to continuing implementation of previously agreed-upon
actions.37 Unlike the Washington or London summits, the Pittsburgh
summit did little more in the area of international financial regulatory
reform than reaffirm commitment to the previously established
agenda. While not a dramatic achievement, this reaffirmation served

(g) support contingency planning for cross-border crisis management,
particularly with respect to systemically important firms;
(h) collaborate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to conduct
Early Warning Exercises; and
(i) undertake any other tasks agreed by its Members in the course of its
activities and within the framework of this Charter.
(2) The FSB will promote and help coordinate the alignment of the activities of
the SSBs to address any overlaps or gaps and clarify demarcations in light of
changes in national and regional regulatory structures relating to prudential and
systemic risk, market integrity and investor and consumer protection,
infrastructure, as well as accounting and auditing.
FSB Charter art. 2.
36. Id. art. 5(1).
37. See generally G-20, The PittsburghSummit Leaders' Statement (Sept. 24-25,2009),
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh-summit_1eaders-statement_250909
.pdf (discussing previous actions and new initiatives for improving the global economy);
G-20, Progress Report on the Actions to Promote FinancialRegulatory Reform Issued by
the U.S. Chair of the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit (Sept. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh-progressjreport_250909.pdf (reiterating the
commitment and specific regulations aimed at addressing the global economic crisis).
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to continue the process of development of technical proposals
through the FSB and its constituents.
In June 2010, at their fourth summit in Toronto, Ontario, G-20
leaders refocused attention on financial sector reform under a fourpillar structure: first, "a strong regulatory framework;" second,
"effective supervision;" third, "resolution and addressing systemic
institutions;" and fourth, "transparent international assessment and
peer review."" This framework, while useful analytically, was not
repeated in the most recent leaders' summit at Seoul, South Korea in
November of 2010.
D.

The Fifth G-20 Leaders' Summit: Endorsing the "New Financial
Regulatory Framework"

In November 2010, in their fifth summit in Seoul, South Korea,
leaders addressed a range of issues, including international financial
regulation.39 Significantly, the fifth summit in November 2010
announced general agreement on technical details developed through
the FSB and its constituent organizations. In relation to financial
regulation, the G-20 abandoned the four-pillar structure of the
Toronto summit and announced the adoption of the "core elements
of a new financial regulatory framework to transform the global
financial system."' Specific policies adopted address (1) "capital and
liquidity standards"; (2) "systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs)" and "global SIFIs (G-SIFIs)"; (3) financial institution
resolution; (4) supervisory effectiveness; and (5) implementation. 4'
The period following the fifth summit, consequently, constitutes
an ideal point to review whether the G-20 has in fact put in place the
"core elements of a new financial regulatory framework" sufficient, at
a minimum, to have prevented the global financial crisis. 42 Table 2
38. See G-20, The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, at 4-5 (June 26-27, 2010)
[hereinafter G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration], available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/g20-declaration-en.pdf.
39. See generally G-20, The G-20 Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration (Nov. 11-12,
2010) [hereinafter G-20, Seoul Summit Declaration], available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents20l0/11/seoulsummit-declaration.pdf (outlining a new stage of international
financial regulation and continued commitment to previously implemented rules).
40. Id. at 7.
41. G-20, The Seoul Summit Document, at 7-9 (Nov. 11-12, 2010), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents2Ol0/11/seoulsummit declaration.pdf. In addition, leaders
identified a range of regulatory issues for further attention, specifically: (1) "macroprudential policy frameworks," (2) "reforms relating to emerging market and developing
countries," (3) "shadow banking," (4) "commodity derivatives markets," (5) "market
integrity and efficiency," and (6) "consumer protection." Id. at 9-10.
42. G-20, Seoul Summit Declaration,supra note 39, at 2.
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summarizes the official views of the G-20 and FSB on the status of the
post-crisis financial regulatory reform agenda at the conclusion of the
fifth leaders' summit.
Table 2: G-20/FSB FinancialRegulatory Reform Agenda: Review of
Status43

Building high-quality capital and
liquidity standards and mitigating
procyclicality

Agreed to dratt capital and liquidity
standards

Addressing SIFIs and resolution regimes

Agreed to framework approach

Improving the OTC derivatives markets

Agreed to detailed principles

Strengthening accounting standards

Convergence between U.S. and
international accounting standards in
progress

Strengthening adherence to
international supervisory and regulatory
standards

FSB established and monitoring
exercises in progress

Reforming compensation practices to
support financial stability

Detailed principles, standards, and
guidance agreed; implementation being
monitored

Developing macroprudential
frameworks and tools

In progress

Expanding and refining the regulatory
perimeter

Under discussion

The following Part addresses financial infrastructure and
prudential regulatory standards, incorporating the G-20/FSB
initiatives relating to capital, OTC derivatives, accounting, and
compensation. These are the areas where arguably the most concrete

43. See generally FSB, ProgressSince the Washington Summit in the Implementation of
the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability: Report of the Financial
Stability Board to G20 Leaders (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.financialstability
board.org/publications/r 1011116.pdf (summarizing G-20 plans to respond to the financial
crisis); G-20, ProgressReport on the Economic and FinancialActions of the Previous G20
Summits, at 18-26 (July 2010), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/07/July
2010_G20_ProgressGrid.pdf.
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progress has been achieved, and they are the central parts of the G20's "core elements." Parts IV and V then turn to issues where
arguably less has been achieved, namely macroprudential supervision
and regulatory design, and addressing SIFIs and financial institution
resolution, respectively."
III. FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION

The G-20 and FSB have focused on five areas to improve
financial infrastructure and prudential regulation: (1) capital,
leverage, liquidity, and procyclicality; (2) OTC derivatives markets;
(3) accounting standards; (4) compensation arrangements; and (5)
expanding the regulatory perimeter to address hedge funds, credit
ratings and credit rating agencies, and securitization." This Part
discusses progress in each area.
A.

Capital,Leverage, and Liquidity
Weaknesses in capital and liquidity, combined with excess
leverage, were a central factor underlying the global financial crisis.46
As a result, the G-20 and FSB have placed major attention on
regulatory reform in these areas. In addressing related issues,
however, G-20 members face conflicting objectives. Specifically,
stronger capital requirements are necessary to prevent future crises,
but, at the same time, higher capital requirements restrict lending,
thereby limiting the financial sector's capacity to support growth amid
economic weakness.4 7 The different economic situations across the G20, with the United States, Europe, and Japan experiencing weak
growth while emerging markets, especially in Asia, are at risk of
possible overheating and asset price inflation, further complicate the
situation.'

44. For discussion of implementation arrangements, see generally Amer & Taylor,
supra note 31 (suggesting international views on implementing financial regulations
globally).
45. FSB, Overview of Progressin the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for
Strengthening Financial Stability, at 2 (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_100627c.pdf?frames=0.
46. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xix-xx.
47. See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Global FinancialStability Report: Sovereigns,
Funding, and Systemic Liquidity, at 38-39 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/02/pdfltext.pdf.
48. See, e.g., IMF, World Economic Outlook: Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing, at
61-77 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/text
.pdf.
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In 2008 and 2009, the G-20 committed to introducing an
enhanced system for capital regulation along with new international
regulatory standards addressing liquidity and leverage regulation,
with the BCBS and FSB given the task of development.4 9 This revised
framework is now referred to as Basel III.
To implement this G-20 mandate, the BCBS has begun to
develop detailed recommendations for adoption. In April 2009 it
made a series of recommendations for addressing procyclicality.o In
July 2009 it announced measures to strengthen the market risk
framework' and enhance Basel 11.52 Initial changes included
introducing higher-risk weightings for securitization, issues relating to
supervisory review of risk management, and disclosure
requirements. Third, the committee released for consultation, as
part of its comprehensive approach announced in September 2009, a
proposal to address (1) improving the quality and harmonization of
capital, focusing on the role of Tier 1 equity; (2) strengthening
counterparty capital requirements relating to derivatives, repos, and
securities financing, with an intention to incentivize movement to
central counterparties and exchanges; (3) introducing a leverage ratio;
(4) measures to promote a countercyclical capital framework,
including provisioning; and (5) introducing a minimum liquidity
standard.54
49. The BCBS was formed in 1974 to coordinate international banking regulation
among G-10 countries. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision [BCBS], History of the Basel
Committee and Its Membership, at 1 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.bis.orgfbcbs/
history.pdf. In 1988, the BCBS agreed to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, setting the basic
framework for regulation of capital of internationally active banks, which was
subsequently adopted in over 100 countries. Id. at 2. Following the Asian financial crisis, it
released a revised framework in 2004, known as Basel II. Id. at 3. For discussion of Basel I
and Basel II and their role in the global financial crisis, see generally Arner, supra note 1.
For discussion of the development of the Basel Committee, see JOSEPH JUDE NORTON,
DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 171-224 (1995).

50. Fin. Stability Forum [FSFI, Report of the FinancialStability Forum on Addressing
Procyclicalityin the FinancialSystem, passim (Apr. 2009), availableat http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf.
51. See BCBS, Revisions to the Basel II Market Risk Framework, at 1-3 (July 2009),
availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl58.pdf; BCBS, Guidelinesfor Computing Capital
for IncrementalRisk in the Trading Book, at 2 (July 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsl59.pdf.
52. BCBS, Enhancements to the Basel II Framework, passim (July 2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl57.pdf.
53. While Basel II is being replaced with Basel IH, the risk-weighting system and the
three-Pillar structure of Basel 1I are currently being maintained; so these changes will be
incorporated into the new framework of Basel III.
54. BCBS, Consultative Document: Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector,
at 2-3 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl64.pdf; BCBS, Consultative

2011]

GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

1599

In June 2010, the G-20 reiterated its support for development of
"a new global regime for bank capital and liquidity."" Under the
agreement, "the amount of capital will be significantly higher" and
"the quality of capital will be significantly improved" to "enable
banks to withstand-without extraordinary government supportstresses of a magnitude associated with the recent financial crisis.""
Specifically, the G-20 agreed that the new capital framework would:
(1) establish a new requirement that each bank hold in Tier 1
capital, at a minimum, an increasing share of common
equity, after deductions, measured as a percentage of riskweighted assets sufficient to withstand with going concern
fully-loss absorbing capital stresses equivalent to those of
the global financial crisis; and
(2) move to a globally consistent and transparent set of
conservative deductions generally applied at the level of
common equity or its equivalent in the case of non-joint
stock companies over a suitable globally consistent
transition period."
Finally, almost two years after the first G-20 leaders' summit, the
BCBS agreed in September of 2010 to the underlying elements of the
new Basel III capital adequacy regime." The G-20 endorsed this new
system at their Seoul summit in November 2010.11
Basel III introduced capitalization requirements focused on
common equity capital. The old framework of Basel I-II mandated
an 8% capital-to-risk weighted asset ratio: at least half of that capital
had to be drawn from Tier 1 capital while the other half could come
from either Tier 2 and Tier 3 assets, both slightly more volatile forms
of capital.' Under Basel III, though, total minimum capital remains
at 8%.1 However, minimum common equity capital is 4.5%, with

Document: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and
Monitoring, at 1-2 (Dec. 2009), availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl65.pdf.
55. G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration,supra note 38, at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 16.
58. Press Release, BCBS, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces
Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards 1 (Sept. 12, 2010), available at http://www.bis
.org/press/p100912.pdf?frames-0.
59. G-20, Seoul Summit Declaration,supranote 39, at 7.
60. BCBS, InternationalConvergence of Capital Measurements and CapitalStandards,
at 12, 16-17 (2006), availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28.pdf.
61. BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and
Banking Systems, at 64 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
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Tier 1 capital at 6%, leaving Tier 2 at most 2%.62 In addition, there
will be a 2.5% conservation buffer, made up of common equity, for a
minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10.5%.6 Finally, there will be the
possibility for an additional countercyclical buffer of 0-2.5% of
common equity or "other fully loss absorbing capital," the details of
which are yet to be finalized.'
It is now abundantly clear that financial institutions will
frequently need to have higher amounts of equity capital. In addition,
the global crisis highlighted that subordinated debt, when held by
other financial institutions, is unlikely to provide external monitoring,
thereby detracting from its ability to support corporate governance
and financial stability.6 5 As a result, subordinated debt has become
significantly less important in terms of capital.
The crisis has also brought forward proposals relating to
innovative capital instruments, such as contingent convertible
securities ("cocos"), which automatically convert to equity when
financial institutions' capital ratios drop to certain preset levels, as
well as other hybrids precommitting investors to provide additional
capital as equity or debt at certain trigger points.' At this point,
however, there is no international approach to these sorts of
instruments.
The other side of the equation relating to the various
methodologies for calculating risk-weightings for assets is also being
considered. While Basel I was overly simplistic, Basel II was overly
complex and too reliant on both external credit ratings and internal
quantitative models. As a result, both were highly subject to gaming
by market participants, with regulators in the United States and
United Kingdom adopting excessively permissive approaches to such
behavior and instruments.67 The crisis has also emphasized the need
to address the way that financial institutions calculate their assets.
Issues relating to off-balance-sheet treatment are being reconsidered
and tightened to avoid a return of the shadow banking system and
also to reduce the complexity of institutions and products. One area
receiving particularly close scrutiny is market risk, with the view that

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supranote 1, at 45-47.
66. See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins & Haig Sirnonian, Swiss Urge CapitalBoost for Banks,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 4, 2010, at 21, availableat http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4a24alc8cf26-lldf-9be2-00144feab49a.html#axzzlEIFnb31W.
67. See generally Amer, supra note 1 (describing the inadequacy of both Basel I & II).
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market risk should be much more closely regulated than has
previously been the case.' Such issues are tied closely not only to
regulatory standards, but also to accounting treatment.
Beyond capital, Basel III includes both leverage and liquidity
standards. As of January 2011, liquidity standards have been
finalized' but remain under discussion, while the leverage ratio at
present is being tested on an experimental basis, without any final
agreement. Beyond bank capital, the work of the BCBS, and the
emergence of Basel III, other financial standards-setters (namely
IOSCO for securities and the IAIS for insurance) are now developing
parallel capital frameworks to enhance financial stability and reduce
regulatory arbitrage at G-20 direction. 0
In reviewing progress, the development of comprehensive new
standards for capital, with much higher requirements for equity
capital and the reduction of the role of subordinated debt, is clearly
an important step. However, studies suggest that even at the new
Basel III rates, capital would still be insufficient to meet the stresses
faced in the global financial crisis." At the same time, the complexity
has not been significantly decreased, indicating the continuing
possibility of market participants' seeking to game the new system, as
they became highly adept at doing with both Basel I and Basel II.
In relation to liquidity, while agreement on a new international
approach is significant, the reality of the standards themselves is that
they are highly subjective and therefore subject to great variations
between markets. At the same time, liquidity must be complemented
by work in other areas, especially OTC derivatives (the subject of the
next section) and issues relating to overall market liquidity provision
(discussed in Part V). As a result, while there is now an international
approach to liquidity, in practice, the implications are highly unclear.
In relation to leverage, a simple leverage ratio has the important
potential to not only limit a central aspect of the buildup of the crisis
(through leverage and related asset price inflation), but also to limit
68. See, e.g., BCBS, Messages from the Academic Literature on Risk Measurement for
the Trading Book 38-42 (BCBS, Working Paper No. 19, 2011), available at http://www.bis
.org/publ/bcbs-wpl9.pdf; BCBS, Findings on the Interactionof Credit and Market Risk 1
(BCBS, Working Paper No. 16, 2009), availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs-wpl6.pdf.
69. BCBS, Basel III: International Standards for Liquidity Risk Measurement,
Standards and Monitoring, at 3-25 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsl88.pdf.
70. See supra Tables 1, 2.
71. See, e.g., BCBS, An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger
Capital and Liquidity Requirements, at 14-17 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsl73.pdf.
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the potential for gaming the capital framework, which, given its
complexity, is to some extent unavoidable. Leverage and capital are
thus probably the two most important international prudential
regulatory issues. At this point, the G-20's core elements do not yet
contain a simple, international standard, which is necessary to
complement complex capital requirements. Without an agreed limit
on leverage, the G-20's reform project fails to meet the test of being
able to prevent the last crisis, before even considering the next crisis.
At the same time, given the increasing lack of differentiation
between business models of banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies, there is a clear need to urgently develop capital, leverage,
and liquidity standards that apply to non-banks, especially to the
extent that different institutions are conducting similar activities.
Significantly, the G-20 has made this a priority moving forward, but
its absence at present is further evidence that international regulatory
reforms to date are still not sufficient to have prevented the global
financial crisis.
B.

OTC Derivatives Markets

The global financial crisis has also exposed the need for a
comprehensive overhaul of derivative regulation. Prior to the global
financial crisis, regulation of OTC derivatives markets was generally
left to private ordering, most often led by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA), with markets limited only to
sophisticated participants and supervision through monitoring of the
major bank participants in the market.72 At the same time, OTC
derivatives received significant legal and regulatory support through
amendments to Basel I and their incorporation into Basel II, as well
as legal changes to support netting in many jurisdictions.7 3 In the
wake of the global financial crisis, the lack of transparency in these
instruments and markets has been a particular area of concern,
especially given their central role in the context of the near collapse
of AIG in 2008 and concerns about their role in the 2010 Greek debt
crisis.74

The G-20 has identified strengthening the resilience and
transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their systemic
risks, including by improving the infrastructure of the OTC markets,
72. SCHUYLER HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES § 1.1 (1st ed. 2003).
73. See generally Amer, supranote 1 (describing Basel II's scrutiny of derivatives).
74. See William Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 989-90
(2009).
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as an area of priority concern. In this context, the G-20 and FSB have
focused on four elements: (1) standardization, (2) central clearing, (3)
exchange or electronic platform trading, and (4) reporting to trade
repositories."
In 2009, the G-20 established an OTC Derivatives Regulators'
Forum (ODRF) to provide technical expertise similar to that
provided by the BCBS in the context of banking.7 6 In June 2010, the
G-20 pledged to accelerate the implementation of OTC derivatives
regulation, reaffirming commitments to trade all standardized OTC
derivatives on exchanges or electronic clearing platforms and clear
trades through central counterparty clearinghouses (CCPs) by the
end of 2012, with reporting to trade repositories." Most significantly,
the FSB released a set of twenty-one principles designed to
implement the G-20 agenda for OTC derivatives." In furtherance of
this G-20/FSB plan, IOSCO and the CPSS are currently reviewing
existing standards for central counterparties and developing
standards for OTC derivatives trade repositories, with draft guidance
released in May 201079 and draft principles released for consultation
in March 2011."
Overall, the FSB principles provide significant details of an
agreed approach to achieve the four targets identified by the G-20.
Their effectiveness, however, will only be determinable in about three
years' time-the amount of time it will probably take for major
financial jurisdictions to implement the principles through legislation
and/or regulation. While the agreed approach may be successful in
time in addressing counterparty risks and even in migrating products
to more transparent and robust exchange-based environments, it is
certainly the case at present that markets remain largely unchanged
from their pre-crisis form.

75. FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, at 1 (Oct. 2010), availableat
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 101025.pdf.
76. See THE OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS' FORUM, http://www.otcdrf.org/ (last

visited Apr. 29, 2011).
77. G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration,supra note 38, at 19.
78. Id.
79. Comm. on Payment & Settlement Sys. & Technical Comm., Int'l Org. of Sec.
Comm'ns [CPSS-IOSCO], Guidance on the Application of the 2004 CPSS-IOSCO
Recommendationsfor Central Counterpartiesto OTC Derivatives CCPs, at 39 (May 2010),
availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss89.pdf.
80. CPSS-IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures: Consultative
Report, at 1-148 (Mar. 2011), availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss94.pdf.
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Accounting Standards

The role of accounting standards in the global financial crisis is a
divisive issue, with many arguing that market-based accounting for
financial instruments ("mark-to-market") was central in worsening
the crisis, as financial institutions were forced to continually revalue
assets in downward spiraling markets, thereby giving an illusion of
ever greater and more solvency-threatening losses.' Others argue
that financial assets can only be valued at current market prices and
that any alternative hides the real financial condition of financial
institutions, thus impeding necessary failures and restructuring.' At
the same time, there is little disagreement that the lack of
transparency of institutions, products, and markets was central to the
process of adverse selection and loss of confidence during the global
financial crisis.83 Likewise, issues relating to transparency made
regulation of firms, markets, and products difficult, and complicated
responses as the crisis developed.
In addressing accounting, the G-20 has repeatedly stated its
commitment to the development of a single set of international
accounting standards.' At the same time, it appears increasingly
likely that, for the foreseeable future, there will remain two main
systems of accounting: IASB International Financial Reporting
Standards and U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). At present, major issues have arisen in the context of what
is the appropriate focus of accounting: the fair value approach based
on market values or the historical basis approach focused on longer

81. See, e.g., Mark It and Weep: Mark-to-Market Accounting Hurts, but There Is No
Better Way, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2008, at 14, 14, available at http://www.economist.coml
node/10808525; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: STUDY ON MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING 1 (2008),

availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket 123008.pdf.
82. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, supra note 81, at 2.
83. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xix-xxiv (describing the lack
of transparency in markets, products, and institutions such as large securities firms and
governmental regulatory agencies); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 1, at 45 (noting that
many responses to the financial crisis call for increased disclosure and transparency as the
single most important response); THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION INTHE
EU, supra note 1, at 8 (concluding that the lack of transparency, combined with the
complexity of structured financial products, contributed to the breakdown in confidence in
financial institutions which spread to tensions in other parts of the financial sector).
84. See G-20, supra note 26, at 1 (listing the development of global accounting
standards as both an immediate and medium-term goal); G-20, supra note 43, at 52-53
(reiterating the G-20's goal of achieving a "single set of high quality, global accounting
standards" and noting the progress that has been made since the 2008 summit).
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horizons." While accounting standard-setters are moving closer on
these issues, they are likely to remain contentious for some time.
In addition, there are a range of issues relating to the relationship
between accounting and regulatory treatment, for instance in relation
to capital, off-balance sheet treatment, and provisioning. In this
context, one objective of Basel II was to bring economic, accounting,
and regulatory capital together. At present, standards and approaches
to economic, accounting, and regulatory capital may once again be
diverging, even though convergence of the three forms of capital
remains a goal.
D.

CompensationArrangements

Improperly assigned incentives inherent in pre-crisis financial
sector compensation arrangements also played an important role in
the buildup of excesses leading to the global financial crisis, and they
led to short-term bias and excessive risk taking." Particular attention
has therefore been focused on compensation practices in the financial
sector, including in the G-20, with compensation reform as an
important reform agenda item since the first leaders' summit in
2008. These commitments have been implemented through G-20
and
endorsement of new FSB compensation principles'
implementation standards.8 9 In relation to implementation, the FSB
concluded a thematic review of member implementation of the
compensation principles and standards in 2010, its first review of the
implementation of post-crisis standards under its new mandate.9 0
85. See generally sources cited supra note 1 (describing controversy that has arisen
over accounting methods).
86. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xix, 61-64 (criticizing
compensation systems that rewarded the "quick deal" and encouraged the "big bet"); THE
HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE EU, supra note 1, at 30-31

(recommending that compensation incentives should be better aligned with shareholder
interests and long-term, firm-wide profitability in place of the short-term, high-risk
compensation incentives that led to the crisis).
87. See supra Tables 1, 2.
88. See FSF, FSF Principlesfor Sound Compensation Practices, at 1 (Apr. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.fmancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 0904b.pdf?frames=0
(setting forth recommendations that "are intended to reduce incentives towards excessive
risk taking that may arise from the structure of compensation schemes").
89. See generally FSF, FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices:
Implementation Standards (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability
(outlining standards for the swift
board.org/publications/ri_090925c.pdf?frames-0
implementation of compensation reforms).
90. See generally FSB, Thematic Review on Compensation:Peer Review Report (Mar.
2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf
(reviewing the implementation of post-crisis standards).
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Compensation is the first major area where the initial G-20
agenda has proceeded through detailed agreement, implementation,
and FSB review, with overall implementation and compliance across
FSB members. As a result, this can be seen as a key test for the
effectiveness of the process. At the least, regulators around the world
are now considering compensation as one element of their
supervisory mandate, and financial institutions have implemented
changes to alter compensation practices accordingly. At present, the
impact is uncertain. The central question will be whether regulators
over time are able to maintain focus in this respect.
E. Expandingthe Regulatory Perimeter:Regulation of
NontraditionalFinancialFirms
At the heart of the global financial crisis were markets, financial
institutions, and products structured to avoid regulation-the
"shadow banking system" and also markets, institutions, and products
that were viewed as not requiring regulation, such as OTC
derivatives. In the wake of the global financial crisis, there is
consensus among G-20 and FSB members that markets, institutions,
and products should no longer be unregulated and that all aspects of
the financial sector should be subject to appropriate levels of
regulation and supervision." In the context of the G-20 financial
reform agenda, related issues have been loosely grouped together
under the heading of "expanding and refining the regulatory
perimeter,"9 2 with the central focus to date being hedge funds and
credit ratings and credit rating agencies. In addition, issues relating to
securitization and shadow banking generally are now being discussed.
1. Hedge Funds
While hedge funds were often viewed as major causes of the
1997-98 Asian financial crisis, they have not received a central
portion of the blame during the recent global financial crisis.9 3 Due to
the lack of transparency in the industry, however, they have still
remained a continuing issue for attention, especially in continental
Europe. 94 At the international level, the G-20 has agreed that hedge
91. See supraTables 1, 2.
92. FSB, supra note 43, at 25-31.
93. THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE EU, supra note 1, at 24
("[H]edge funds ... did not play a major role in the emergence of the crisis."). For
detailed discussion of hedge funds' role in the crisis, see SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE
MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE MAKING OF A NEW ELITE 9-14 (2010).
94. See id.
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funds should be subject to appropriate regulation, especially in the
context of systemically important hedge funds." To date, IOSCO has
established six high-level principles for regulation, 6 guidance
addressing their funds,' and a template for the global collection of
hedge fund information to support transparency and supervision. 98
Significantly, IOSCO released a revised version of its key principles
document, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,
including a new principle requiring hedge funds and hedge fund
managers/advisors to be subject to appropriate oversight. 99
Overall, while not directly a cause of the global financial crisis,
the lack of transparency in the hedge fund industry poses potential
risks for financial stability going forward. As a result, this may be one
area where the international regulatory reform agenda is in fact
successful in moving beyond merely addressing the causes of the last
crisis to seeking to address future risks.
2. Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies
Prior to the global financial crisis, credit rating agencies (CRAs)
had been periodically subject to criticism in the context of most
corporate and financial crises. 10 As a result some attention had been
given to their role and regulation, such as in IOSCO's 2003 Principles
for the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies"' and Code of
Conduct." However, since the global financial crisis, credit ratings
and CRAs have become a central focus.
As an initial step in 2008, IOSCO revised the Code of Conduct in
response to the initial stages of the crisis, including adding provisions

95. See supra Tables 1, 2.
96. See Technical Comm., Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns [IOSCO], Hedge Funds
Oversight: Final Report, at 8-9 (June 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD293.pdf.
97. Id. at 7-9.
98. See FSB, supra note 43, at 13.
99. IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, at 10 (July 2010),
availableat http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf.
100. See generally Amador N.R. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
and Rated Markets (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/09/129, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf (noting that losses in crises have
engendered repeated calls for CRA regulation).
101. IOSCO, IOSCO Statement of PrinciplesRegarding the Activities of Credit Rating
Agencies, at 1-4 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/

IOSCOPD151.pdf.
102. Technical Comm., IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating
Agencies: Report of the Technical Committee, at 1-2 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf(IOSCOPD180.pdf.
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regarding structured finance."o3 The FSF also met and released a
report on enhancing market and institutional resilience that, in many
ways, would be overshadowed by subsequent events. In this report,
the FSF focused on regulatory reforms in five main areas, including
the role and uses of credit ratings, and a mandate to review the use of
credit ratings and regulation of CRAs through IOSCO, the Joint
Forum-comprising the BCBS, IOSCO, and the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors-and domestic regulators.10o
This report focused on two main aspects: first, regulation of CRAs,
and, second, reducing regulatory and market reliance on credit
ratings themselves. 0 In a follow-up report during the systemic phase
of the crisis, the FSF reviewed progress and recommitted to the
content of its April 2008 report, including CRAs and credit ratings,
especially in regard to establishing a globally consistent approach to
CRA regulation."o6 Both of these FSF reports were subsequently
largely subsumed in the November 2008, April 2009, and September
2009 G-20 statements, all of which express commitment to the
regulation of CRAs.
IOSCO recently has conducted a review of the implementation
of the Code of Conduct'" and released guidance relating to
international cooperation in CRA oversight.10 More significantly,
and related to the 2008 FSF report, the Joint Forum has reviewed the
use of credit ratings.'" Most significantly, in June of 2010, the G-20
committed "to reduce reliance on external ratings in rules and
regulations,""o with the FSB releasing a related principles in October
2010.n

103. Id. at 5-6, 10-11.
104. FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and
Institutional Resilience, at 2, 34, 39, 44 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf.
105. Id. at 32-39.
106. FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and
Institutional Resilience: Follow-up on Implementation, at 2-9, 20-23 (Oct. 10, 2008),
available at http://www.financialsbailityboard.org/press/pr_081009f.pdf.
107. IOSCO, A Review of the Implementation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct
Fundamentalsfor Credit Rating Agencies-Reportof the Technical Committee of IOSCO, at
3 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD286.pdf.
108. IOSCO, InternationalCooperation in Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies: Report
of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, at 3-5 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.iosco
.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD287.pdf.
109. Joint Forum, BCBS, Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings, at 1-2 (June 2009),
availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf.
110. G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration,supra note 38, at 19.
111. FSB, Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings, at 1-7 (Oct. 2010),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf.
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Credit ratings and CRAs certainly share an important portion of
the blame for the global financial crisis. In initial international efforts
focusing on registration and regulation of CRAs, the G-20, FSB, and
IOSCO began the process of addressing related issues. However, the
determination in 2010 to refocus attention on reducing reliance on
credit ratings must be seen as by far the most important step from the
standpoint of systemic stability, with the new principles setting the
basis for addressing an important element underlying the global
financial crisis.
3. Securitization
Techniques of securitization were clearly abused prior to the
global financial crisis. Instruments, markets, and methodologiesespecially their overcomplexity, financialization, and lack of
transparency-were at the heart of the crisis.112 At the same time,
securitization provides a range of potential benefits in relation to
financing and risk-sharing." 3 While securitization should not be
prohibited, significant changes to regulatory treatment are necessary
to support effectively functioning markets. To date, securitization
markets have not yet recovered internationally. While a range of
reports and standards have been released," 4 significant questions
regarding the future of securitization remain.
This is a clear area requiring further international attention and
one at the heart of the most recent crisis. Since the market is still
barely functioning, the issue currently has less urgency than others.
However, if the issue is not addressed comprehensively at the
international level in the near future, it is most certainly possible that
momentum for reform will be lost-potentially leaving one of the
most important causes of the global crisis unaddressed.

112. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 42-45, 67-72; FIN. SERVS.
AUTH., supra note 1, at 14-16; THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE EU,

supra note 1, at 39-42.
113. See generally D. Amer et al., The Global Credit Crisis and Securitization in East
Asia, CAPITAL MARKETS L.J., July 2008, at 291 (noting that securitization has the ability

to assist with funding and investment in East Asia).
114. See generallyJoint Forum, BCBS, Report on Special Purpose Entities (Sept. 2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf (describing special purpose entity
structures and associated policy issues for regulators and market participants); Technical
Comm., supra note 96 (recommending various principles regarding the regulation of
hedge funds); Technical Comm., IOSCO, Transparency of Structured Finance Products:
Consultation Report (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.iosco.orgflibrary/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD306.pdf (describing factors for consideration regarding the development of
"post-trade transparency" for structured finance products).
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Overall, then, significant progress has been made in core areas
relating to financial infrastructure and prudential regulation. At the
same time, despite this level of progress, this analysis suggests that
reforms to date would still not have been sufficient to prevent the
global financial crisis and that forward-looking reforms are even more
limited. If the greatest progress at the international level has been
achieved in the context of financial infrastructure and prudential
regulation, far less has been achieved in relation to three other core
issues addressed in the following two Parts of this Article:
macroprudential supervision and regulatory coverage; addressing
SIFIs, especially G-SIFIs; and financial institution resolution.
IV. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY DESIGN
Two serious failures, both relating to the scope and coverage of
domestic, regional, and international regulation, were at the heart of
the global financial crisis."' The first failure was the regulatory gaps,
overlaps, and divisions in a number of jurisdictions, especially the
United States, that presented opportunities for regulatory avoidance
and arbitrage. Combined with a general philosophy of regulatory
permissiveness,116 this allowed financial institutions to organize their
operations to minimize, and in many cases avoid, regulatory scrutiny.
At the same time, global markets and financial institutions maximized
regulatory arbitrage opportunities within individual economies and
across jurisdictions, with the result that no single regulator had a clear
picture of all of the activities and risks of any given global financial
institution or market despite the attention placed on consolidated
supervision during the two decades prior to the global financial crisis.
Moreover, financial institution management in most cases did not
have a clear understanding of the scope of their own operations, risks,
and legal structure.117 These elements have been brought to light most

115. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 52-56, 75-80; FIN. SERVS.
AUTH., supra note 1, at 36-37; THE HIGH-LEVEL GRP. ON FIN. SUPERVISION IN THE EU,
supra note 1, at 15.
116. See generally ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN
A NEW WORLD (2007) (describing his approach to financial sector issues as chairman of
the Federal Reserve); FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION:
FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/other/principles.pdf (describing the United Kingdom's "high-level" and less rulesoriented approach to financial regulation).
117. See, e.g., Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 142, In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/ ("Some [Lehman Brothers'] directors did not recall
knowing that Lehman had ever been in breach of its risk appetite limits.").
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clearly by the near failure of AIG and the insolvency of Lehman
Brothers. Likewise, significant financial markets were organized to
minimize regulatory scrutiny and interference, resulting in a lack of
transparency for complex global financial institutions and for many of
the markets and products in which they dealt."' The clearest
examples were the markets for credit risk transfer such as
securitization and CDS, with the most extreme example being the
pre-crisis shadow banking system of conduits, structured investment
vehicles, and complex structured products.
The second supervisory failure was the excessive focus of
financial authorities-finance ministries, central banks, and
regulatory agencies-on the safety and soundness of individual
financial institutions, or microprudential supervision. As noted in the
previous paragraph, authorities in many cases failed even in this
responsibility; they also failed to consider linkages across institutions,
supervision.
macroprudential
markets, and
products, or
Macroprudential supervision-focusing on overall market stability
and interlinkages-was largely neglected, despite increasing numbers
of central banks being given or taking on specific objectives relating
to overall financial stability in the ten years preceding the global
crisis.
Two central lessons can be drawn. The first is the necessity of
putting in place appropriate macroprudential arrangements,
domestically and regionally. The second is the necessity of reviewing
the design of domestic and regional regulatory structures to address
gaps and reduce the potential for regulatory arbitrage.
A.

MacroprudentialSupervision

Following the November 2008 G-20 declaration that all SIFIs,
markets, and instruments would be subject to appropriate regulation,
in April 2009, the G-20 financial system declaration provided a much
greater level of detail.119 Specifically, the April declaration included
eight aspects. First, regulatory systems should be reformed to ensure
that authorities are able to identify and take account of
macroprudential risks across the financial system, including regulated
banks, shadow banks, and private pools of capital, to limit the buildup of systemic risk, with the FSB, BIS, and international standard118. See, e.g., R. Herring & J. Carmassi, The Structure of International Financial
Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BANKING 115,197 (A. Berger et al. eds., 2009).
119. G-20, supra note 29, at 1-6.
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setters tasked to develop specific macroprudential tools.120 Second,
the G-20 agreed that large and complex financial institutions require
particularly careful oversight given their systemic importance.12 1
While seemingly self-evident, this reflects an important shift in
emphasis from the pre-crisis period, in which such firms were viewed
as better able to address the risks they faced than regulators, to the
post-crisis period, in which the internal risk management systems of
large financial institutions will be closely monitored by regulators. In
support of this, G-20 national regulators must have the powers
necessary to gather relevant information on all material financial
institutions, markets, and instruments in order to assess the potential
for either their failure or severe stress to contribute to systemic risk.
Beyond traditionally systemically significant firms, the G-20 proposed
registering hedge funds or their managers and requiring them to
disclose appropriate information-including leverage-on an ongoing
basis to supervisors or regulators for assessment of the systemic risks
that they pose individually or collectively. 22 At the same time,
supervisors will "require institutions which have hedge funds as their
counterparties to have effective risk management," including
"mechanisms to monitor the funds' leverage and set limits for single
counterparty exposures.""
In relation to credit derivatives,
"standardization and resilience of credit derivatives markets, in
particular through the establishment of central counterparties and
clearing arrangements subject to effective regulation and
supervision," will be promoted through working in conjunction with
industry participants in developing an action plan on standardization,
with ISDA taking a particularly active role thus far.'24 To keep pace
with future innovation, G-20 members will "review and adapt the
boundaries of their regulatory frameworks regularly to keep pace
with developments in the financial system and promote good
practices and consistent approaches at the international level.""2
In June 2010, the G-20 tasked the FSB, in consultation with the
IMF, to report on recommendations to strengthen both
macroprudential and microprudential oversight and supervision,
"specifically relating to the mandate, capacity and resourcing of
supervisors and specific powers" to proactively identify and address
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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risks.'" Further, in November 2010, the G-20 identified
macroprudential supervision as requiring further attention,127 a
sentiment echoed by the FSB.12
At this point, despite an increasing amount of attention to the
subject 29 and the fact that there is universal agreement that it is
highly important, there is little agreement on how actually to go about
it.
B.

Designing Effective Regulatory and Supervisory Systems

Aside from implementing appropriate macroprudential
supervision to address the scope and coverage of regulation,
jurisdictions must evaluate the overarching design and structure of
the financial regulatory and supervisory system. The financial crisis
brought into clear focus the potential for regulatory arbitrage, and it
illustrated the very real need for jurisdictions to address the gaps in
their regulatory systems that made that possible. In the context of the
financial stability issues that arose during the global financial crisis,
given that many issues arose from regulatory gaps and divisions, it is
important to consider the system in a broad and integrated way.
The global financial crisis has thus demonstrated that the overall
design and coverage of a regulatory system are vital to its
effectiveness. As highlighted by the G-20, there is an urgent need to
review and enhance the scope of regulation, focusing on regulatory
design to eliminate gaps and implement effective macroprudential
financial system oversight. This requires a reshaping of regulatory
systems so that authorities are able to identify and take account of
macroprudential risks, with the scope of regulation and oversight
extending to SIFIs, instruments and markets, including non-bank
financial institutions. Furthermore, prudential standards must be
designed to address cross-sectional dimensions (how risk is
distributed across a financial system) and time dimensions (how
aggregate risk evolves over time) to build buffers for use in bad times.
126. G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration,supra note 38, at 5, 17.
127. G-20, Seoul Summit Declaration,supra note 39, at 3, 9-10.
128. FSB et al., MacroprudentialPolicy Tools and Frameworks: Update to the G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 1 (Feb. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/othpl3.pdf.
129. See, e.g., Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macroprudential Policy-A
Literature Review 3-4 (BIS, Working Paper No. 337, 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/work337.pdf; Lotte Schou-Zibell et al., A Macroprudential Framework for
Monitoring and Examining FinancialSoundness 1-2 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper
Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 43, 2010), available at http://www.adb.org/
documents/papers/regional-economic-integration/WP43-Macroprudential-Monitoring.pdf.
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International consensus and guidance on structural issues has
been limited, and design has been considered a domestic matter.
Following G-20 directions, IOSCO released guidance related to
unregulated financial markets and products in September 2009.130 In
October 2009, the IMF and FSB discussed information gaps in
regulation, including those resulting from regulatory design.
Most significantly, in January 2010, the Joint Forum released an
initial review of related issues. 132 The Joint Forum emphasized four
fundamental guiding principles:
(1) Similar activities, products, and markets should be subject
to similar minimum supervision and regulation.
(2) Consistency in regulation across sectors is necessary;
however, legitimate differences can exist across the three
sectors.
(3) Supervision and regulation should consider the risks posed,
particularly any systemic risk, which may arise not only in
large financial institutions but also through interactions and
interconnectedness among institutions of all sizes.
(4) Consistent implementation of international standards is
critical to avoid competitive issues and regulatory
arbitrage.'3 3
In relation to reducing regulatory differences, the Joint Forum's
recommendations included consistency across sectoral financial
principles (e.g., the BCBS Core Principles of Effective Banking
Supervision) and organizations (e.g., the BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, and
IASB); development of uniform capital standards for insurance and
securities similar to those for banking; and development of crosssectoral standards as necessary (e.g., in relation to mortgage
origination and credit risk transfer).134

130. See Technical Comm., IOSCO, Elements of InternationalRegulatory Standardson
Funds of Hedge Funds Related Issues Based on Best Market Practices:Final Report, at 3-7
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD305.pdf.
131. IMF & FSB, The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps: Report to the G-20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 9-11 (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf.
132. Joint Forum, BCBS, Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial
Regulation: Key Issues and Recommendations, at 1-2 (Jan. 2010), available at
http://www.iaisweb.org/_templReview-of theDifferentiatedNatureandScope-ofFina
ncialRegulation_-January_2010.pdf.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 11-24.
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In relation to financial groups, the recommendations focused on
ensuring that all financial groups, particularly those operating crossborder, are subject to comprehensive regulation and supervision on
the basis of updated international standards addressing
conglomerates, that supervisory colleges 35 operate consistently across
sectors, and that cross-sectoral issues are appropriately addressed.136
Given the central role of regulatory gaps and regulatory arbitrage in
the global financial crisis, these are issues that are likely to be central
to future IMF and FSB regulatory reviews, especially in the context of
concerns that arise from complex financial groups of systemic
significance.
At this point, there is no international consensus on which model
of regulatory structure is best.'3 ' However, there is an important
relationship among regulatory structure (and attendant financial and
human resources), financial structure (i.e., the relative importance of
banking, insurance, and capital markets and the level of financial
development), and the structure of financial institutions (e.g., strict
separation of financial sectors versus universal banking). The
fundamental issue is how to appropriately tailor an economy's
financial regulatory structure to its own circumstances and structure it
to address financial intermediary activities and financial
conglomerates. To the extent that SIFIs, instruments, and markets are
unregulated, or opportunities for regulatory arbitrage exist, the
potential risks for future instability increase.
With this in mind, regulatory structure must be designed to
coincide with an economy's financial structure.138 There must be full
coverage of the intermediaries (especially financial conglomerates),
135. Supervisory colleges are groupings of individual regulators from the various
jurisdictions in which a cross-border financial institution operates. The objective is to
ensure that regulators have a clear picture of the entire operations of a given financial
institution and that their actions are coordinated to the extent possible. See generally
BCBS, Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl77.pdf (describing supervisory colleges and the most
effective ways to implement them).
136. Joint Forum, supra note 132, at 11-24.
137. For a discussion of options in the context of Hong Kong, see Douglas W. Amer et
al., FinancialRegulation in Hong Kong: Time for a Change, 5 ASIAN J. COMP. L., Nov. 1,
2010, at 1, 41-47, http://www.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1238&context=asjcl.
For discussion of options in the context of the United Sates, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE

available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
(2008),
138-42
Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
138. For a full discussion of financial structure, see generally ARNER, supra note 9,
explaining the fundamental relationship between law, the institutional framework of
financial systems, and economic development.
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functions, and risks inherent in a given financial system, in such a
manner that coincides with the history, culture, legal system, and level
of financial development of that economy. An additional risk involves
financial structure and regulatory design-a potential financial and
regulatory mismatch. The risk is that a jurisdiction's financial
regulatory structure will not equate with the structure of its financial
sector; in this author's opinion, financial intermediaries will seek to
organize their activities on a basis not appropriately addressed by the
regulatory structure. In such circumstances, it is possible that
significant risks may develop through financial intermediary
operations that are not supervised by the existing structure. For
example, in a financial system requiring strict separation of financial
institutions and activity across sectors (e.g., the U.S. Glass-Steagall
model), informal financial groups may develop that are regulated not
on a group basis, but rather on a sectoral institutional basis, leaving
the financial system exposed to the risks of the group.
Finally, a key issue highlighted in systems in which the regulatory
functions are separated from the central bank is coordination,
especially in the context of macroprudential supervision and liquidity
provision. In economies where these functions are separated, the
global financial crisis has underlined an absolutely fundamental need
for robust information sharing and coordination arrangements,
especially in times of crisis.
Unlike issues relating to financial infrastructure and prudential
regulation discussed in Part III, issues relating to macroprudential
supervision and overall regulatory design have not yet been
significantly addressed at the international level. In the context of
macroprudential supervision, this will likely reflect the fact that, while
it is a very good idea in theory, it is difficult to translate into practice.
In relation to regulatory design, G-20 and FSB members have
adopted a range of differing domestic approaches, and any
international consensus seems unlikely. At the same time, in the
context of the FSB and IMF review and monitoring process, this must
take a central place.
V. SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RESOLUTION

Problems in SIFIs were central to the global financial crisis, as
was the lack of effective financial institution resolution mechanisms in
G-20 jurisdictions at the time of the global financial crisis. Both are
fundamental issues for international consideration in the context of
reviewing their effectiveness in addressing related systemic risks.
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Following discussion of progress in relation to regulation of SIFIs,
this Part considers mechanisms to address financial institution
difficulties in three key areas: liquidity arrangements, deposit
insurance, and resolution systems.
A.

Addressing SIFIs and G-SIFIs

SIFIs and G-SIFIs-not only banks but also non-bank financial
institutions such as investment banks, insurance companies, and the
shadow banking system-were at the heart of the global financial
crisis.139 Around the world, a key lesson of the crisis is the need for
appropriate regulatory and supervisory arrangements for such
institutions, especially large complex global financial institutions,
regardless of their form.
In April 2009, the G-20 established an outline of approaches
going forward, with the FSBl1 tasked to, among other things, "set
guidelines for, and support the establishment, functioning of, and
participation in, supervisory colleges, including through ongoing
identification of the most systemically important cross-border
firms."141 Additionally, the FSB will "support contingency planning
for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to
systemically important firms,"14 2 while continuing "to support
continued efforts by the IMF, FSB, World Bank, and BCBS to
develop an international framework for cross-border bank resolution

arrangements." 143
The FSB has focused on three goals: (1) reducing the probability
and impact of failure through regulation and supervision, (2)
improving resolution capacity and preparedness, and (3)
strengthening core financial infrastructure and markets.'" As an
initial step, the IMF, BIS, and FSB have developed guidance on
assessing the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets,
and instruments that addresses questions relating to systemically

139. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xviii.
140. The FSF, at this point, had been reconstituted as the FSB. Press Release, FSF,
Financial Stability Forum Re-established as the Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2, 2009),
availableat http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090402b.pdf.
141. G-20, supra note 30, at 1.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2.
144. FSB, Progress Since the Pittsburgh Summit in Implementing the G20
Recommendations for Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20
Finance Ministers and Governors, at 9 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107a.pdf.
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important institutions as well as macroprudential considerations.14 5 In
addition, the IMF and FSB have analyzed information gaps in crossborder institutions and their supervision. 14 6 Supervisory colleges have
been the major mechanism adopted, with such arrangements
established for more than thirty large, complex financial
conglomerates and coordinated through the FSB, with similar
arrangements being developed through European bodies for
European SIFIs.'47 In addition, institution-specific recovery and rapid
resolution plans, known as "living wills," are in the process of being
developed for the identified G-SIFIs.14 8
In June 2010, the FSB released an initial report on reducing
moral hazard risks posed by SIFIs.'49 Further, in June 2010, the G-20
tasked the FSB with developing recommendations to address and
resolve problems associated with SIFIs, including financial sector
responsibilities for associated costs.s 0 In October 2010, the FSB

145. IMF et al., Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of FinancialInstitutions,
Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, at 24-31 (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf.
146. IMF & FSB, supra note 131, at 9-26.
147. FSB, supra note 144, at 13. The BCBS has developed draft guidance on
supervisory colleges. See generally BCBS, Good Practice Principles on Supervisory
Colleges (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbsl70.pdf (offering a set of
principles that supervisory colleges should follow to perform effective supervision).
148. G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration,supra note 38, at 18. For full discussion of
"living wills" or "resolution and recovery plans," see generally E. Avgouleas et al., Living
Wills as a Catalystfor Action (Duisenberg Sch. of Fin., Policy Paper No. 4, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1533808, describing the benefits of
living wills for the resolution of insolvent SIFIs.
149. See generally FSB, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_100627b.pdf (proposing a supervisory framework that will reduce moral
hazards in financial entities).
150. G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration,supra note 38, at 5, 18. According to the FSB
report, guidance is built on the following principles:
1.

All jurisdictions should have in place a policy framework to reduce the moral
hazard risks associated with [SIFIs] in their jurisdictions.

2.

All jurisdictions should have effective resolution tools that enable the
authorities to resolve financial firms without systemic disruptions and without
taxpayer losses ....

3.

All jurisdictions should have the capacity to impose prudential requirements
on firms commensurate with their systemic importance....

4.

All national supervisory authorities should have the powers to apply
differentiated supervision requirements for institutions based on the risk they
pose to the financial system.
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released detailed recommendations and timelines for their
implementation,"' endorsed by the G-20 in Seoul. 5 2 The SIFI
recommendations contain a very large number of recommendations
(fifty-one) across six areas, addressing overall framework, G-SIiFIs,
SIFI resolution, SIIFI supervision, financial infrastructure, and
consistency of implementation.
This central issue, then, is finally progressing, with the SIFI
recommendations representing a significant consensus with an agreed
timeline (the end of 2012).153 If implementation is successful, this will
mark a major milestone and one which would have gone a long way
in preventing the global financial crisis had it been in place
beforehand. At the same time, implementation will pose particular
challenges in many jurisdictions, given that many have concentrated
banking systems, with a small number of banks dominating most
markets. 5 4 Moreover, in many jurisdictions, these dominant banks
have close connections with the state, making any potential problems
arising in such institutions both economically and politically
significant."' Such dominant and systemically important institutions

5.

All jurisdictions should put in place or strengthen core financial market
infrastructures to reduce contagion risk upon a firm's failure, and encourage
their use.

6.

FSB members will establish an ongoing peer review process to promote
national policies to address the risks associated with SIFIs that are effective in
global risk reduction, as well as consistent and mutually supportive and thus
avoid regulatory arbitrage and promote a level playing field. Supervisory
colleges and crisis management groups will have an important role in seeking
to ensure that the legitimate interests of home and host authorities are being
taken into account and to assist in improving cooperation.

FSB, supra note 149, at 1-2.
151. See generally FSB, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important
Financial Institutions: Recommendations and Timelines (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf (giving details for the
proposal).
152. G-20, Seoul Summit Declaration,supranote 39, at 7.
153. Id. at 12.
154. Thorsten Beck et al., FinancialInstitutionsand Markets Across Countries and over
Time: Data and Analysis 8-9 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1414705. For the
most comprehensive source of data for these conclusions, see generally Thorsten Beck et.
al, A New Database on Financial Development and Structure, THE WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUXO (last updated Nov. 2010).
155. For bank ownership data and analysis, see generally J. BARTH ET AL.,
RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: UNTIL ANGELS GOVERN (2005); J. Barth et al., Bank
Regulation & Supervision, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978PO
(last updated June 2008) (supporting database).
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raise not only special concerns for financial stability, but also for
moral hazards, given their economic and political significance and
interconnection. Such issues indicate that regulation and supervision,
especially of dominant banks in individual economies, are of
significant and continuing concern and rate the highest level of
attention from both domestic regulators and regional cooperative
mechanisms.
In the context of SIFIs, especially those with government
involvement, individual jurisdictions will have to carefully consider
the sorts of risks that such institutions will be allowed to undertake.
Internationally, related debate currently centers on the proposal in
the United States, known as the Volcker Rule, to limit the trading
activities of banks."' While it is arguable that a Volcker Rule
prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading would not
have prevented the global financial crisis (and this argument in all
likelihood even extends as far as the pre-1999 United States
separation between banking and securities in the context of the GlassSteagall system),157 jurisdictions will need to carefully balance the
sophistication of their major banks and other financial institutions,
level of development of their markets (especially in terms of crosssectoral activities), effectiveness of their regulatory and supervisory
arrangements, and, most importantly, personnel.
The global financial crisis has shown not only that domestic
institutions pose potential systemic risk but also that foreign financial
institutions-whether banks or otherwise-do as well. Foreign
institutions therefore must also be subject to appropriate regulation
and supervision in each jurisdiction in which they operate, across
regions in which they are potentially systemically important, as well
as globally. Supervisory colleges are an appropriate starting point for
such institutions at each level: domestic, regional, and international.

156. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Financial
Reform (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-financial-reform.
157. See generally Martin Mayer, Brookings Inst., Glass-Steagall in Our Future: How
Straight, How Narrow (Nov. 2010) (unpublished policy brief), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1505488 (arguing that a direct relationship exists between the
repeal of Glass-Steagall and the financial crisis); Peter J. Wallison, Am. Enter. Inst., Did
the "Repeal" of Glass-Steagall Have Any Role in the Financial Crisis? Not Guilty. Not
Even Close. (Nov. 2009) (unpublished policy brief), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=1507803&rec=1&srcabs=1505488 (arguing that there was no relationship
between the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the financial crisis).
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Liquidity Arrangements

Liquidity arrangements were central to addressing the systemic
phase of the global financial crisis, including domestic measures
(especially in the United States and United Kingdom), regional
measures (through the European Central Bank), and international
measures (primarily through bilateral swap lines from the U.S.
Federal Reserve). There is a mixture of implicit and explicit
structures for liquidity provision, which, prior to the crisis, were
generally referred to in the context of a lender of last resort. In most
cases, the lender of last resort is the central bank, but in some cases it
can be the deposit insurance authority, usually in conjunction with the
central bank. Under the prevailing pre-crisis formulation, the
provision of liquidity support in the context of lender of last resort
operations generally followed the following rules:
(1) Support should only be provided to temporarily illiquid but
solvent financial intermediaries.
(2) Support should be provided freely but at penalty interest.
(3) Support should be provided to anyone with good collateral
who meets both rules (1) and (2).
(4) The lender of last resort should make its readiness to lend ex
ante.
(5) Nonetheless, the decision to provide support should remain
discretionary.
(6) This discretion should be based upon the test of the existence
5
of potential systemic risk. 1
Based on experiences during the global financial crisis, there was
one main weakness in this formulation and its operation: although the
formulation was not explicitly limited to banks, as practiced up to the
global financial crisis, the general rule applied by central banks
operating as lenders of last resort was to limit the availability of
support to systemically significant banks. In retrospect, this
formulation, when tied to the regulatory focus on banks rather than
all systemically significant institutions and markets, made responses
to the initial stages of the crisis difficult, especially in the United
States. Overall, lender of last resort support (or, perhaps more
appropriately termed, liquidity provider of last resort) needs to be
158. ARNER, supranote 9, at 139.
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available across the financial system to any illiquid but solvent and
systemically significant financial institution or market.
Financial authorities should develop appropriate systems of
liquidity support for financial institutions and the financial system
generally. As such, the legal foundation for liquidity provision needs
to be carefully considered in each jurisdiction for regulatory
arrangements, macroprudential systems, and financial structure.
C.

Deposit Insurance and Investor ProtectionArrangements

Like liquidity arrangements, deposit insurance arrangements
have been central to addressing systemic issues. Recognizing that
existing guidance was insufficient, the BCBS and the International
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), which was established in
May 2002,159 released an extensively revised set of principles for
deposit insurance in June 2009.16
Jurisdictions that have put in place blanket guarantees will face
initial challenges. In these jurisdictions, there is a clear necessity to
review existing arrangements to identify weaknesses that required the
use of the blanket guarantee as a backstop during the crisis. Based on
experiences in the global financial crisis, it is likely that many of these
weaknesses resulted from inadequate coverage (in both banks and
non-bank financial institutions) as well as improperly designed payout
systems in which depositors faced long delays in payment, thus
incentivizing runs.16 In moving from blanket guarantees to improved
defined coverage systems, jurisdictions can maximize understanding,
and thereby effectiveness, by focusing not only on the design of the
system, but also on communicating the removal of the guarantee and
disseminating details of the system.
Other jurisdictions still maintain implicit guarantees-often in
the financial systems with large, systemically important and, in some
159. The IADI is hosted by the BIS but is not presently a member of the FSB.
160. See BCBS & IADI, Core Principlesfor Effective Deposit Insurance Systems, at 2-5
(June 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl56.pdf. The standards, comprising
eighteen principles in ten groups, address (1) "[s]etting objectives" (principles 1-2); (2)
"[m]andates and powers" (principles 3-4); (3) "[g]ovemance" (principle 5); (4)
"[r]elationships with other safety-net participants and cross-border issues" (principles 67); (5) "[m]embership and coverage" (principles 8-10); (6) "[flunding" (principle 11); (7)
"[plublic awareness" (principle 12); (8) "[s]elected legal issues" (principles 13-14); (9)
"[flailure resolution" (principles 15-16); and (10) "[r]eimbursing depositors and
recoveries" (principles 17-18). Id. at 2-5.
161. See William Buiter, The Lessons from Northern Rock, FIN. TIMES ECONOMISTS'
F. (Nov. 13, 2007, 4:05 PM), http:/Iblogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2007/11/the-lessons-fro
html/.
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cases, government-connected banks and other financial institutions.
Such jurisdictions should carefully review their safety net design in
the context of reviewing regulatory and supervisory arrangements for
systemically significant financial institutions (discussed above). In this
context, there is a need for careful balancing of reality (large financial
institutions will often not be allowed to fail) and real moral hazard
risks. In jurisdictions where large financial institutions are unlikely to
be allowed to fail under any circumstances, the corollary is that the
risks that these institutions undertake must be strictly limited. At the
same time, even in the context of the largest financial institutions,
having in place an explicit system of deposit insurance and other
compensation arrangements for financial institution customers
(especially insurance customers) has the potential to enhance the
incentives of management and reduce moral hazard.
D.

FinancialInstitution Resolution Arrangements

Overall, it is clear that the failure of large, complex, global
financial conglomerates triggered the systemic phase of the current
global financial crisis. As recognized by the G-20, one of the greatest
failures of both international and domestic legal and regulatory
systems has been the lack of appropriate arrangements, including
adequate insolvency arrangements, to address such failures when they
occur. 16 2 Following the difficulties experienced in dealing with the
failure or near failure of large, complex, global financial
conglomerates, such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, the central
approach is a framework based upon prevention of failure as the first
element and mechanisms to address failure when they occur as the
second.
In the context of financial institution resolution arrangements,
the most significant element is the increased focus on mechanisms to
address failure of financial institutions operating on a cross-border
basis-a problem that is not easy to solve and one that is likely to
require significant time and effort before a workable approach is
reached.16 1In response to the G-20 mandate to address this issue, the
FSF released the most significant attempt to date to address issues of
failure resolution." In this set of principles, the FSF stated, "The
162. See supra Part II.D.
163. See Douglas Amer & Joseph Norton, Building a Frameworkto Address Failureof
Complex Global FinancialInstitutions, 39 HONG KONG L.J. 95, 112-13 (2009).
164. See Press Release, FSF, Financial Stability Forum Issues Recommendations and
Principles to Strengthen Financial Systems 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.bis
.org/press/p090403b.pdf.
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objective of financial crisis management is to seek to prevent serious
domestic or international financial instability that would have an
adverse impact on the real economy."16 s At the same time, the FSF
recognized that such financial crisis management "remains a domestic
competence," albeit one requiring cross-border cooperation.'"
In relation to preparation, authorities are to
[d]evelop common support tools for managing a cross-border
financial crisis, including these principles: a key data list; a
common language for assessing systemic implications (drawing
on those developed by the [EU] and by national authorities); a
document that authorities can draw on when considering
together the specific issues that may arise in handling severe
stress at specific firms; and an experience library, which pools
key lessons from different crises. 6
In addition, supervisors will meet at least annually through the
college framework,'" share a range of information on large, complex
financial institutions'16 9 and ensure that firms have internal
contingency plans in place.17 0
In managing financial crises, authorities are to
[s]trive to find internationally coordinated solutions that take
account of the impact of the crisis on the financial systems and
real economies of other countries, drawing on information,
arrangements, and plans developed ex-ante. These coordinated
solutions will most likely be mainly driven by groups of
authorities of the most directly involved economies.17'
In June 2010, G-20 leaders committed to "design and implement
a system where they have the powers and tools to restructure or
resolve all types of financial institutions in crisis, without taxpayers
ultimately bearing the burden."1 7 2 Leaders endorsed the
recommendations of the BCBS on cross-border bank resolution, 73
stating that resolution regimes should provide for
165. Id. at 11.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 11-12.
170. Id. at 12.
171. Id.
172. G-20, supra note 37, at 5, 17.
173. BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-borderBank Resolution Group:
Final Paper, at 1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl69.pdf. The ten
recommendations address (1) "[e]ffective national resolution powers," (2) "frameworks
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(1) proper allocation of losses to reduce moral hazard and
protect taxpayers;
(2) continuity of critical financial services,
uninterrupted service for insured depositors;

including

(3) credibility of the resolution regime in the market;
(4) minimization of contagion;
(5) advanced planning for orderly resolution and transfer of
contractual relationships; and
(6) effective cooperation and information exchange domestically
and among jurisdictions in the event of a failure of a cross-

border institution.174
The recent pronouncements from the G-20 and FSB are a very
useful start, especially in addressing regulation, supervision, and
contingency planning for financial institution failure. However, the
statements, reports, and principles, while recognizing the problems
raised by such failures, largely leave actual resolution to domestic
authorities. This suggests that in the final analysis, individual
jurisdictions will have to carefully consider their own arrangements
with respect to the potential failure of a large, complex financial
institution operating within their jurisdiction and take appropriate
precautionary actions. Unfortunately, even in the wake of the global
financial crisis, while it may be possible to develop adequate
international arrangements relating to prevention of financial
institution failure, there is still insufficient consensus with respect to
actual insolvency arrangements for any international framework to
emerge at present. In such a context, individual jurisdictions must act
proactively in building preventive arrangements based on
internationally agreed approaches. At the same time, there is likely to
be a continued lack of arrangements to deal with actual insolvencies
of large, complex financial institutions at the international level.
Individual jurisdictions should thus separately mandate capitalized
subsidiaries that are subject to domestic insolvency arrangements for

for coordinated resolution of financial groups," (3) "[c]onvergence of national resolution
mechanisms," (4) "[c]ross-border effects of national resolution mechanisms," (5)
"[rieduction of complexity and interconnectedness of group structures and operations,"
(6) "[pjlanning in advance for orderly resolution," (7) "[c]ross-border cooperation and
information sharing," (8) "[s]trengthening risk mitigation mechanisms," (9) "[t]ransfer of
contractual relationships," and (10) "[e]xit strategies and market discipline." Id. at 10.
174. G-20, Toronto Summit Declaration,supra note 38, at 17-18.
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global firms appropriate for the activities being engaged in the
individual jurisdiction. At present this is the only arrangement
capable, to some extent, of limiting the damage in individual
jurisdictions resulting from the failure of large, complex, cross-border
financial institutions.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a question: has the post-crisis
international financial regulatory reform agenda met its minimum
objective of putting in place an agreement on the necessary elements
to prevent and address the systemic risks which arose in the global
financial crisis? In seeking to answer this question, this Article has
reviewed the agenda set by the G-20 and developed by the FSB and
its constituents.
At the outset, the agenda largely parallels the agreed causes of
the global financial crisis and the necessary elements of regulation to
address systemic risk. In addition, there has been a great deal of work
and progress on agreeing to international approaches to major postcrisis regulatory issues. At the same time, it is clear that despite its
claims of having established the "core elements of a new financial
regulatory framework to transform the global financial system"175 at
its most recent leaders' summit in Seoul, South Korea, the G-20 and
the FSB have not been entirely successful in meeting this minimum
test. Adaptation, therefore, to date has not yet been sufficient to
establish future resilience.
First, while there has been significant progress in addressing
financial infrastructure, prudential regulation, and regulation of SIFIs
and G-SIFIs, there has been much less progress in relation to
macroprudential supervision, regulatory design and coverage, and
resolution of financial institutions-all core crisis issues. Second, in
relation to the central issue relating to financial infrastructure-OTC
derivatives markets-there has been significant agreement on the way
forward, one which may in fact ultimately prove sufficient to have
prevented the crisis. Only time will tell, for markets may not change
fundamentally from their pre-crisis structure and that significant
systemic risk will remain. Third, in relation to the fundamental
prudential issues-capital, liquidity, and leverage-while there has
been very significant progress in relation to capital and, to a lesser
extent, liquidity, leverage requirements remain to be dealt with.

175. G-20, Seoul Summit Declaration,supra note 39, at 7.
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These are in fact central to the effectiveness of the capital and
liquidity requirements.
Going beyond the minimum requirement of policies sufficient to
have prevented the last crisis, post-crisis international regulatory
efforts to date have been far less successful in meeting the real goal:
putting in place a financial regulatory system which is able to address
future crises. At this point, with the limited exception of the
regulation of hedge funds, the G-20 and FSB have yet to move
toward a more forward-looking approach. Preparation for future
crises certainly must be the objective over the coming years.
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